HM Government, JDP Campaign Planning. Add to My Bookmarks Export citation. HM Government, JDP Campaign Planning. Type: Document; Date. CAMPAIGN PLANNING. HANDBOOK. Academic Year Editor: COL Mark Haseman. United States Army War College. Department of Military Strategy. and JDP , Campaign Planning. The British define campaign as a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve strategic objectives within .
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Plannning information is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence MOD. No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments, except as authorised by both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.
HM Government, JDP 5-00 Campaign Planning
This information may be subject to privately owned rights. Readers wishing to quote JDPs as reference material in other work should confirm with the DCDC Doctrine Editor whether the particular publication and amendment state remains authoritative. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment are welcomed by the Doctrine Editor at: Requests for issue of this publication, or amendments to its distribution, should be referred to the DSDA Operations Centre.
All publications including drafts are available to view and download at: This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine. The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.
JDNs do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position, but are raised in short order by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre DCDC to establish and disseminate current best practice. They also provide the basis for further development and experimentation, and a doctrinal basis for operations and exercises.
The Military Contribution, this change provides guidance on the incorporation of strategic communication into the operational planning process.
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 5-00 CAMPAIGN PLANNING
See paragraphs and Planning at the Operational level: Hierarchy of Military Activity: See paragraphs to Based cmapaign good practice developed during recent UK and coalition operations, JDP describes the process of Defence crisis management and the fundamentals of operational planning. JDP is aimed primarily at those engaged in or studying operational level planning, specifically staff employed in: It will also be of considerable use to those routinely employed in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation including representatives from Other Government Departments specifically the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the multi-departmental Stabilisation Unit.
JDP is divided into 3 chapters: Chapter 1 Analysis emphasises the importance of a JFC understanding the strategic context as a precursor to effective planning. It describes the role capmaign Analysis in providing a JFC with the requisite knowledge of the context within which he may be required to intervene, as part of a comprehensive response to a crisis. Chapter 2 Planning describes the campaign planning process.
With an understanding of the strategic context already caampaign through Analysis, the 6-Step Operational Estimate enables a JFC to frame the problem and then, through a flexible and adaptive process designed to address ill-structured problems, establish a suitable course of action to achieve campaign success. Chapter 3 Defence Crisis Management describes the development of military strategic direction, and subsequent operational level planning for national, multinational and multi-agency campaigns and operations.
JDP is linked plannig JDP Campaign Execution. Knowledge of UK doctrine alone will planniing be sufficient to prepare headquarters staff for planning a multinational operation.
Campaign planning | Ministry of Defence | Official Press Release
The most likely coalitions will be US led and, although this doctrine is compatible with that of our major allies, it is not identical. Therefore, every effort should be made to become familiar with the equivalent doctrine of the lead nation or organisation. JDP reflects principally UK national arrangements. Commanders and more probably their staff should know where to access relevant alliance and coalition lead nation doctrine. JDP is coherent with the thrust of extant Allied joint doctrine: Useful guidance on operating within an ad hoc coalition can also be found in the Multinational Interoperability Council Coalition Building Guide.
JDP 01 Campaigning addresses the military contribution, from the perspective of the JFC, 1 in the context of a comprehensive national or multinational strategy. This publication focuses on the planning of the military contribution, principally at the operational level.
An important precursor to planning is analysing the context within which a particular crisis has arisen, or looks as if it might arise in the future. Rationale for Analysis Understanding the nature of a crisis situation to which the term analysis refers helps to identify the problem as jdl of the process of planning; both of these are separate from and should precede determining the solution.
This Chapter describes in detail the rationale for situational understanding, the key issues being: Complex crises do not lend themselves to simple definition or analysis, but a significant start point in the crisis management process is a description of the current llanning, in terms that promote shared understanding for as many stakeholders as possible.
Any particular crisis may usefully be described as a series of plannin that characterise what is perceived to be wrong and what might be changed to improve matters; in other words, that which is required to effect a planned transition from one set of conditions to another, often described 5-00 a theory of change. Crises may arise in numerous different ways and, as importantly, be perceived differently by individual actors.
Ambiguity, confusion and contradiction are likely to permeate, more or less continuously.
The time available for analysis will almost always be limited, demanding a trade off between the improvement of understanding and the imperative to develop clear orders and instructions. Context and Complexity The need for a commander to understand his situation, and to keep on updating that understanding before and during a campaign, is not new. There are, however, 2 reasons why analysis the campaitn of all the constituent elements of a situation, and their inter-relationships, in order to obtain capmaign thorough understanding of the past, present and anticipated operational context is particularly important.
First, it provides a commander with an appreciation of the potential complexity and, second, the process begins to indicate based on existing unfavourable conditions what might represent plannung more favourable situation in the future.
The term context is used to describe 5-0 relevant circumstances, participants and relationships, surroundings, and other influences that, collectively, form the setting for an event or crisis. Analysis, the scope of which is described in Annex 1A, indicates: The conditions under which military jdo is required including geospatial, political, demographic, cultural and language factors.
The actors involved hostile, friendly, neutral or belligerentto what extent they are involved and why. The nature of participants involvement history, culture, relationships, motivations, perceptions, interests and desired outcomes. Other influences, both internal for instance, societal factors and external for example, regional hegemony.
The nature of the military activity required from our own jrp, with whom it is to be carried out including allies, coalition kdp and Other Government Departments OGDsand who such activity is intended to affect or what it should achieve Dealing with Complexity. Understanding context depends on not only acquiring the requisite knowledge, drawing upon information and intelligence, but also nd Edition.
It is ultimately a commander s own reasoning and judgement that provide him with ca,paign comprehension or individual perception of a crisis situation. This thorough comprehension is perhaps the pre-eminent challenge for a JFC, as he prepares to frame the problem and to plan the military contribution to the response. Because crises are invariably complex with a multitude of frequently interconnected parts they also tend to be: Adaptive, such that any action causes reaction and any benefit has an associated opportunity cost.
Uncertain, often confusing; some risks may be incalculable. Ambiguous, in that they can be perceived in ccampaign different ways by different actors or external observers; there is seldom a universal view of the context to any particular problem however manifestly clear the situation may appear from an individual perspective.
Competitive or adversarial, requiring compromise, if not submission, in relation to conflicts of interest or need, or perceived security. Constrained, by different plannung varying commitment to resolve a crisis, their capability to do so, and internal and external legitimacy to try. Unbounded, and permeating, or being affected by, regional dynamics and, with increasing globalisation, the rest of the international community as well. Dynamic, altering from the moment that military or other intervention is anticipated, let alone occurs A crisis situation should be examined in its entirety as a system, recognising that no single element exists in isolation.
Intervention itself invariably alters the dynamics of a situation. Moreover, almost all situations are open systems affected by external intervention and influences as well as by internal dynamics.
Nature of Analysis Analysis is expansive and open-minded; it is different from problem-solving per se, which of necessity tends to be more narrowly focused on the key issues.
Analysis not only takes into account all relevant factors, better to understand the complexity and causes of a crisis, but it also actively seeks to pkanning what has hitherto been unknown, and to include different perspectives, including the novel, the contrary and the extreme.
HM Government, JDP Campaign Planning | University of Exeter
Effective analysis is best achieved by accessing multiple sources of information and intelligence in the time available; not just from the nd Edition. In interpreting the information presented, steps should be taken to guard against partiality or bias, especially given the natural inclination to exclude the unexpected, the inexplicable, the unpalatable or the counter-intuitive.
Analysis is never exhaustive, nor absolutely certain, for the dynamics of most crises are too complex and volatile, but effective analysis can help a JFC to rationalise though not necessarily reduce that complexity and ambiguity to some degree Periodic review, including by those previously uninvolved, can provide a fresh perspective on a JFC s analysis and offset any tendency towards groupthink.
During the execution of a campaign, while analysis will often become better informed, the gap between perception and reality like the gap between actual and reported crime will always remain elusive Analysis does more than look at the current situation, it also addresses what might happen next, based upon alternative assumptions regarding the actions and reactions of different actors including the impact of any intervention.
Together these enable a JFC to: Understand the context in which he is operating or intends to operate. Understand the potential impact of his actions or other events. Act upon this understanding to maximise the positive effects of any intervention and to minimise the negative As well as informing a JFC of what is known its primary purposeanalysis also identifies knowledge gaps, indicating risk of the unknown which should be managed accordingly.
Analysis also highlights risk in broader terms, namely the risk associated with acting or not acting, and the risk of failure. Risk management is covered in Chapter nd Edition.
McNamara introduced many modern business practices into the Pentagon, including computer-based forms of systems analysis, which used almost exclusively quantitative numerical data.
In theory the process was transparent to all; in practice few could understand the sheer weight of data presented. It was also thought that some results were effectively tailored by analysts to support decisions that McNamara had already taken.
Systems analysis was introduced to support analysis and assessment of the conduct of the Vietnam War. Its emphasis on quantitative data led, amongst other things, to the notorious body count. Large numbers of staff spend considerable effort analysing and assessing, but systems analysis did not deliver adequate direction to tactical commanders. Analysis and assessment are critical to the conduct of military operations. But it is important not to allow the tools and processes used to overtake their purpose, which is to guide military decision-making.
Numerical assessments have their place, but so too does a commander s subjective analysis. Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, wholeheadquarters activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterise a situation.
As a situation evolves, analysis is updated by continuous assessment of progress. As a preliminary activity to planning, albeit one that continues during both planning and execution, analysis is invariably carried out against a finite, and often challenging, timeline.
It should be managed pragmatically and purposefully, to provide situational understanding; analysis is a means to an end Expansive. Analysis is about understanding the nature of the crisis situation; it is during the planning process that a JFC searches for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives and expanding knowledge rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue nd Edition.
Although time is always a limiting factor, consideration should be given to as many sources of information and ideas, perspectives and opinions as possible. Additional credible views and insights, however inconsistent or contradictory, can enrich understanding Receptive.